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81FSIEC
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      UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
      SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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      JUANA SIERRA,
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                     Plaintiff,
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                                               07 CV 6769
                 V.
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      THE CITY OF NEW YORK,
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                     Defendant.
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                                               New York, N.Y.
 9
                                               January 14, 2008
                                               4:20 p.m.
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      Before:
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                            HON. JED S. RAKOFF,
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                                              District Judge
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                                APPEARANCES
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      URBAN JUSTICE CENTER
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           Attorneys for Plaintiff
      AMI T. SANGHI
      LESLIE T. ANNEXSTEIN
16
      WEST SIDE SRO LAW PROJECT
17
           Attorney for Plaintiff
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      MARTI WEITHMAN
19
      MICHAEL A. CARDOZO, Corporation Counsel
      for the City of New York
20
           Attorney for Defendant
      JERALD HOROWITZ
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22
     Also present:
23
     YARROW WILLMAN-COLE
24
     Spanish Interpreter
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1 (Case called)

(In open court)

THE DEPUTY CLERK: January 14, 2008, Juana Sierra v. City of New York. Counsel, please state your appearances for the record.

MS. SANGHVI: Ami Sanghi for Urban Justice Center for plaintiff Sierra.

MS. ANNEXSTEIN: Leslie Annexstein, Urban Justice Center, for plaintiff Sierra.

MS. WEITHMAN: Martha Weithman, West Side SRO Project, for plaintiff Sierra.

THE COURT: Is this Ms. Sierra?

MS. WEITHMAN: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Do we have a translator for her?

MS. WEITHMAN: Yes, we do.

MR. HOROWITZ: Jared Horowitz, Corporation Counsel for the City of New York for the defendant. I also have with me deputy agency counsel Carol Steinberg sitting with me and the witness, Moon Wha Lee, is sitting behind me.

THE COURT: Okay, very good.

All right, just for the purpose of the record, when this cases was first brought, Ms. Sierra, the plaintiff, was then living in a so-called SRO unit with her child, and was facing eviction, and the lawsuit, which was brought both against her landlord and against the City of New York and

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various agencies in the City of New York, challenged the New York regulation, New York City Housing Maintenance Code Section 27-2076B, which prohibits children from living in single room occupancy units on the ground that it constitutes discrimination on grounds of familial status in violation of the federal Fair Housing Act.

It early on became obvious to the Court that a substantial issue needed to be briefed, namely, whether there was a problem under the anti-injunction provision of federal law, because part of what was being asked for was in effect a stay of the eviction proceedings, and I determined that the anti-injunction act did prohibit the actions as far as the landlord was concerned, but not so far as the City was concerned.

Meantime, the plaintiff entered into a settlement with the landlord by which she vacated the premises in return for \$19,000, and thus the case was ultimately dismissed on consent of all parties, including the City, with respect to the landlord.

Since the plaintiff is no longer facing eviction, the City then moved to dismiss the lawsuit as to it on grounds of lack of standing in the sense that there was no actual controversy sufficient to meet Article 3 standards, and that is the motion that we will hear today.

In connection with that motion, in addition to the

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legal briefs from both sides, I received an affidavit from Ms. Sierra and an affidavit from Dr. Lee, and I determined that I did not need to have an evidentiary hearing, but that I might have to address for my own clarification some modest questions to them, and I think we ought to deal with that first so that the argument then can be made by counsel in light of what emerges from the very brief questioning that I have for the two witnesses, and I appreciate their being here today.

Maybe we ought to start with Dr. Lee, because Ms. Sierra may want to remain here in any event, but Dr. Lee, although he's more than welcome to remain, may also want to go home. So, Dr. Lee, why don't you come on up? MOON WHA LEE,

called as a witness by the Court,

having been duly sworn, testified as follows:

THE COURT: Please be seated.

DIRECT EXAMINATION

BY THE COURT:

So I appreciate the benefit of your affidavit, but I had a couple of questions. For the record, the witness' full name is Moon Wha Lee. He is Assistant Commissioner for housing policy analysis and statistical research of the New York City Department of Housing Preservation and Development, a position he has held since 1992, and he received a PhD in urban planning from Columbia University in 1983.

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Lee - direct

Now, in paragraph 5 -- do you have a copy of your affidavit?

- A. No, I don't have it, sir.
- THE COURT: Can counsel please hand a copy to the witness?
- Q. Did you draft this, by the way, or did counsel draft it for you?
- 8 A. Mostly I drafted myself, sir.
 - Q. All right. So on paragraph 5, you say, quote, "The median rent for all occupied and vacant rooming units as a whole in 2005 was \$644." Do you see that?
- 12 A. Yes, sir.
- Q. And then you say later in that paragraph, that in her affidavit, quote, "Plaintiff stated the monthly rental payment of \$522.15 was affordable to her." Do you see that?
- 16 | A. Yes, sir.
- Q. And you say, quote, "Based upon this statement, she could not afford to live in a rooming unit today, even if such units were available," close quote. Do you see that?
- 20 A. Your Honor, yes.
- Q. Now, what I don't understand is, a median rent means that there's a range. So one could not conclude that she couldn't afford an SRO unit unless one knew the range, true?
- 24 | A. Yes, sir.
- 25 | Q. Do you know the range?

81FSIEC Lee - direct

- A. I don't have numbers now.
- Q. Okay. And the other question I had is -- two more questions, really.

The difference between an SRO unit and a non-SRO unit is that the SRO unit doesn't have kitchen and bathroom facilities, true?

A. Yes, sir.

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- Q. So if everything else was equal, wouldn't you expect the rent of the SRO unit to be lower?
- A. I don't have rent information vacant available rooming units, because such numbers are so small, but not necessarily big rent for vacant available rooming units, it's the lower, because usually asking rent for vacant unit is much higher than contract rent for occupied units, sir.
- Q. Why is that?
- A. Because asking rent is rent information provided by either owner or managing agent or supers and so on, and if unit is vacant, owners usually expect higher rent than occupied unit.
- Q. Why? In other words, I hear what you're saying and it's important, but I don't understand why that would be so. Why would one -- obviously, this is ultimately an issue of supply and demand, though not exclusively.
- A. Asking rent is what owners, managing agents and supers once have it, but on the other hand, contract rent is rent specified in lease contract. So usually asking rent, asked by owner,

81FSIEC Lee - direct

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managing agent, super is higher. Ultimately, contract rent usually is lower than asking rent, because after negotiation they can have contract.

- Q. But I'm not sure you're focusing on my question. I understand the asking is higher than the ultimate rent, but what I'm saying is, if you had two apartments that were essentially identical in terms of location, amount of space, everything except that one included a kitchen and bathroom and the other did not, would not you expect that the price of the SRO unit would be lower, the rent price?
- A. It may be conceivable, but rent for SROs or room units not necessarily lower than regular apartment. Therefore, also start off also for short-term occupancy, sometimes not monthly rent but weekly rent added up by how many weeks, months, they're staying. So not necessarily they are lower. Sometimes they could be higher.

For example, if you have residential apartment and the long-term residential hotel, they're not necessarily lower, but sometimes they could be higher than rent for regular apartment. I don't have data in my hand.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. Those are the questions I had. Thank you so much. You may step down.

(Witness excused)

THE COURT: Now, let's get Ms. Sierra on the stand with the translator.

| | 81FSIEC Lee - direct |
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| 1 | Let me first ask the interpreter to identify herself |
| 2 | for the record. |
| 3 | THE INTERPRETER: My name is Yarrow Willman-Cole. |
| 4 | THE COURT: Are you a Court-certified interpreter? |
| 5 | THE INTERPRETER: No. |
| 6 | THE COURT: What's your training? |
| 7 | THE INTERPRETER: I'm actually a tenant organizer, but |
| 8 | I'm fluent in Spanish. |
| 9 | THE COURT: So you're associated with the plaintiff's |
| 10 | counsel here? |
| 11 | THE INTERPRETER: I don't work on the case, but I work |
| 12 | in the same office. |
| 13 | THE COURT: But you are, if you will, ideologically |
| 14 | aligned with them, yes? |
| 15 | THE INTERPRETER: I work in the same office. |
| 16 | THE COURT: In the same office, on similar matters, |
| 17 | from a tenant's point of view? |
| 18 | THE INTERPRETER: Sure. |
| 19 | THE COURT: Tell me your background. How did you |
| 20 | become fluent in Spanish? |
| 21 | THE INTERPRETER: I actually studied Spanish, it was |
| 22 | my major in college. |
| 23 | THE COURT: Where did you go to college? |
| 24 | THE INTERPRETER: I went to Ohio State. |
| 25 | THE COURT: Okay. You didn't study football? |
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81FSIEC
                                Lee - direct
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                THE INTERPRETER: I also lived abroad for a number of
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      years.
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               THE COURT: Where?
               THE INTERPRETER: Spain, Central America, Costa Rica
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      and Honduras.
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               THE COURT: For how long?
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               THE INTERPRETER: For two-and-a-half years.
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               THE COURT: Are you confident you can fairly and
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      accurately interpret these proceedings?
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               THE INTERPRETER: Yes.
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               THE COURT: Were you the interpreter on the affidavit?
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               THE INTERPRETER: Yes.
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               THE COURT: Please raise your right hand. Do you
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      swear to accurately and completely interpret from English into
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      Spanish and Spanish into English the questions put to the
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      witness and the answers given?
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               THE INTERPRETER: Yes, I do.
               THE COURT: All right. Now ask the witness, if you
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      will, to raise her right hand.
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       JUANA SIERRA,
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           called as a witness by the Court,
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           having been duly sworn, testified as follows:
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               THE COURT: Okay, please be seated.
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     DIRECT EXAMINATION
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     BY THE COURT:
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| | 81FSIEC Sierra - direct |
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| 1 | Q. So, Ms. Sierra, thank you very much for your affidavit. |
| 2 | What is the present status as of today of your search for an |
| 3 | apartment? |
| 4 | THE INTERPRETER: She said she would like to live in |
| 5 | Manhattan. |
| 6 | Q. Have you found an apartment? |
| 7 | MR. HOROWITZ: I'm sorry, I can't hear the |
| 8 | interpreter. |
| 9 | A. Not yet, no. |
| 10 | THE COURT: You'll have to speak louder so counsel can |
| 11 | hear you. |
| 12 | THE INTERPRETER: Sure. |
| 13 | THE COURT: The answer is, "not yet." |
| 14 | Q. Do I understand that you are able to spend something like |
| 15 | \$522 or so on rent? |
| 16 | A. Yes, but I don't, I can't find any place with that amount |
| 17 | that I was paying before. |
| 18 | Q. How did you calculate that amount? |
| 19 | THE INTERPRETER: She doesn't understand the question? |
| 20 | Q. Who drafted your affidavit? |
| 21 | THE INTERPRETER: Her lawyer. |
| 22 | Q. Which lawyer? |
| 23 | THE INTERPRETER: Marti, she says. |
| 24 | THE COURT: Meaning? |

MS. WEITHMAN: That's me, your Honor.

81FSIEC Sierra - direct

- 1 | Q. Where are you living now?
- THE INTERPRETER: She lives at 135th West 238th Street in the Bronx.
- Q. And is that a residence that you rent or is it a residence
- 5 | that belongs to a friend or what?
- 6 THE INTERPRETER: She's living with her son.
- 7 | Q. And so that's his apartment?
- 8 A. Yes.
- 9 | Q. And, now, you have a young child, is that it?
- 10 A. Yes.
- 11 | O. One or several?
- 12 THE INTERPRETER: She has two younger children; one
- 13 | that's 15 and one that's 6.
- Q. Now this, the person whose apartment you're living in is an
- 15 | older son?
- 16 | A. Yes.
- 17 | Q. How old is he?
- 18 | A. He's 23.
- 19 | 0. What does he do for a living?
- 20 A. He works in a kitchen.
- 21 | Q. What kind of apartment does he have?
- 22 A. An apartment of two bedrooms.
- 23 | Q. Now, are you presently employed?
- 24 | A. Not right now.
- 25 | Q. So you say in your affidavit, quote, "I have a low income

Sierra - direct

- and my rent for two rooms was \$522.15, which is affordable for me." Is that still affordable for you?
- A. Yes.

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- Q. What is the most you think you could pay for an apartment?
- 5 A. The most probably 600.
- Q. How are you presently conducting your search for a new apartment?

THE INTERPRETER: She doesn't understand the question, your Honor?

- Q. I think you said you were looking for a new apartment?

 THE INTERPRETER: She's saying yes, she is looking,
- because the Bronx is too far since her children are going to school in Manhattan.
 - Q. So my question is, how are you going about looking for an apartment?

THE INTERPRETER: She's saying that she was asking around, but then she said that she was working before, and that at such a low income that it makes her very difficult for her to find anything.

- Q. Well, I understand that, but what I'm unclear about is when you say you're asking around, are you still continuing to look for an apartment now?
- 23 THE INTERPRETER: She said yes to your question.
 - Q. And if a single room occupancy unit was available for \$600 or less, would that be an apartment you would consider moving

Sierra - direct

THE COURT: All right. Thank you very much, you may

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into?

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Α. Yes.

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step down.

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(Witness excused)

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THE COURT: All right, I'm ready to hear oral argument from counsel, beginning with counsel from the City.

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MR. HOROWITZ: Good afternoon, your Honor. Your Honor, because of the plaintiff's vacatur of the rooming unit, there's no longer a case or controversy before the Court.

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THE COURT: Why not? She wants to move with her two young children into an apartment. She would be perfectly happy to move into an SRO for \$600 or less, but she is effectively prohibited by law from doing so because if she does so, she will be in violation of New York City, of the very New York City ordinance that she is challenging. What more does she

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need?

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Court, the plaintiff had two rooming units for \$522. Now, just to seek one rooming unit, which, by the way, can't house three people, would cost, assuming, you know, the facts that she's

MR. HOROWITZ: But, your Honor, previously before the

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presenting, that she could even find a rooming unit for \$522,

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it still would not be sufficient for the living requirements

for herself and her family.

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THE COURT: That's not her testimony. I don't for

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these purposes make any credibility determinations. She says she'd be happy to move into that. It's clear from what your expert said that he doesn't have information as to the full range of rents, he only knows the average rent. It's clear that she'd be willing to go up to \$600, although she is low income, she now has a little money, because she just got \$19,000 from her beloved former landlord, and so the situation she's presented with is that one segment of the otherwise available housing stock is not available to her by virtue of the regulation of the City.

MR. HOROWITZ: But, your Honor, the point I'm trying to make is simply that while she has an interest in -- she's expressed an interest, testified that she has an interest in obtaining an SRO unit, the defendant's position is that it's economically prohibitive because she requires two rooming units, and she hasn't established that she can afford two rooming units. A rooming unit can physically only house one or possibly --

THE COURT: What was your understanding of the rent she was paying at the previous place that she was living; \$520, right?

MR. HOROWITZ: That's correct, for two rooming units.

THE COURT: So we know from that, that there are rooming units available at that price, right?

MR. HOROWITZ: No, we don't, your Honor.

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1 THE COURT: Oh? This was a unique landlord who was giving a special bargain to anyone he could then induce to come 2 3 in in violation of the law that he would thereafter evict? MR. HOROWITZ: Your Honor, I can't speculate as to how 4 5 she came about getting those two rooming units. 6 THE COURT: What's your basis for believing there was no such unit available other than the one she actually was 7 8 living in? 9 MR. HOROWITZ: Your Honor, all defendants are saying, based upon Moon Wha Lee's affidavit, Dr. Lee's affidavit is 10 that the median rent for one unit is \$644. 11 12 THE COURT: But the question I put to him, and I agree 13 that that was very helpful, but he was frank to tell me that he 14 doesn't know the range. The median is meaningless without the 15 range. 16 MR. HOROWITZ: Well, your Honor, we're not suggesting 17 that there aren't rents that are less than \$644. 18 THE COURT: Well, that's good, because the median by 19 definition means there must be. 20 MR. HOROWITZ: That's correct. What we are saying, 21 and this is the thrust of the defendant's argument, is 22 possibilities. There is a very slim possibility that -- and 23 Mr. Lee's conclusion was highly improbable -- that the 24 defendant -- I'm sorry, that the plaintiff would be able to get

another rooming unit, for two reasons: One is affordability,

and second, is the available units. There aren't many units. Dr. Lee's testimony or his affidavit suggests that the number of rooming units is so small, I believe he mentioned that in his testimony before your Honor today, it's so small that you can't even really measure it properly because of it, and, your Honor, I'd like to --

THE COURT: Well, I'm not sure what -- I don't believe he ever gave me a number, either in this affidavit or in his testimony. What he says, and you're referring to paragraph 4 of his affidavit, is that according to the 2005 New York City housing and vacancy survey, which is the latest survey containing data on occupied and vacant rental housing in New York City, the number of vacant available rooming units, which is what he's referring to or what we've been calling SRO rooming units, quote, "is too small to be used in a statistically reliable manner, considering sampling and non-sampling errors," and I inferred from that that, therefore, any generalizations about this are highly speculative on your part.

MR. HOROWITZ: Well, no, your Honor. The statistics relating to the number of apartments as opposed to rooming units, that is can be measured, and those statistics are provided in paragraphs 6 and 7 of -- and also 5, I guess. I'm sorry, 6 and 7 for the vacant rental units.

THE COURT: I mean, this was why I put the question.

In those two paragraphs he says that there were 7,318 vacant available rental units of all types in the city with a monthly asking rent less than \$600. The vast majority of these units were regular apartments, not rooming units. So it follows from that there is some number of rooming units that are vacant that have a monthly asking rent of less than \$600, correct?

MR. HOROWITZ: That's correct.

THE COURT: So, and she says those would be something she'd like to consider.

MR. HOROWITZ: Your Honor, the point I'm trying to bring out is probabilities of that happening are slim to none.

Your Honor, the --

THE COURT: So slim to none that she managed to find in actuality two rooms for \$522. Mirabile dictu, as you would say.

MR. HOROWITZ: Your Honor, if I may, the burden which is on the plaintiffs to establish standing also requires that the controversy be of immediacy and reality. Beyond even finding a rooming unit which you and I have been arguing about, there's also the inability that the defendant has to issue a violation pursuant to --

THE COURT: No, I don't agree with that at all. Your point about the number of units is not without some force and I want to hear from your adversary on that, although I'm skeptical of the argument. The argument about violation seems

to me to be, forgive my putting it this way, sufficiently lacking in merit as not to require a response.

She is harmed by the fact that assuming that there are such units realistically available, assuming, therefore, the contrary of your first argument, that she can't possibly consider, realistically consider moving in, because it would be a violation of law. You seem to be making the argument in your papers that she should first break the law, then the landlord should break the law, and only after the City finally enforces the law does she have standing to challenge the law. I know of no case that supports that proposition.

MR. HOROWITZ: But, your Honor --

THE COURT: That she has to be a law-breaker first and the landlord has to be a law-breaker second, before she could have standing to challenge this ordinance. That would be an extraordinary view of Article 3 standing.

MR. HOROWITZ: Well, your Honor, in her affidavit she says that the basis upon which she's challenging the statute is she doesn't want to risk eviction.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. HOROWITZ: Again, and if possibly when --

THE COURT: She doesn't want to put herself in the position of breaking the law. And that's why she's bringing this challenge.

MR. HOROWITZ: But, your Honor --

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THE COURT: Are you saying, I mean, for example, supposing, let us assume contrary to the fact, supposing 99 percent of all housing units in her price range available to her were SRO's, and she very much would have been happy to live in one of those, in my hypothetical, innumerable available units, but she could not go into those units because she knew the law said that she was, if she did so, she'd be violating the law. And you're saying in that situation, before she would have standing to bring an action under the Fair Housing Act, she would have to say, notwithstanding that, I'm prepared to be a law-breaker, I'll bet I could find a landlord who will also break the law with me, and it will only be when the City issues a violation that I'll be able to challenge this law. That cannot be the law standing, counsel.

MR. HOROWITZ: Well, your Honor, the statute, the way the statute is drafted, the statute applies to the landlord, not to the tenant. The statute directs that in the event that -- well, first of all, gives the City the discretion to impose a violation for the statute --

THE COURT: So you're saying you can't challenge a law that violates, a city ordinance that violates federal law because the City sometimes will choose to enforce its laws and sometimes won't? That can't be the law, either.

MR. HOROWITZ: Your Honor, all we're talking about is contingencies, and what we're saying is that there are

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contingencies to the enforcement of this statute against the plaintiff which haven't yet happened yet, and that's -- there's not a sufficiently concrete controversy before the Court, because, number one, the plaintiff isn't in a rooming unit, and we don't even know whether she can get a rooming unit.

THE COURT: I see. I mean, this is in effect a facial challenge and basically what she's saying is you have through the ordinance excluded her from some segment of the available housing units that she otherwise would like to consider. In terms of the Fair Housing Act, you are in effect making unavailable to her a dwelling because of familial status. That's her argument.

Now, I agree with you that if the housing supply consisted of 5 million non-SRO's and one SRO, something that is that remote might not supply sufficient standing to bring a facial challenge.

MR. HOROWITZ: Well, that's what we have here, your Honor.

THE COURT: That's your first argument. We're past your first argument, we're on to your second argument. The first argument I'm going to hear from your adversary in a minute. But your fallback argument is, even if that's not so, it's not until she actually gets violated that she has standing. I just don't see that at all.

MR. HOROWITZ: Well, your Honor, the cases that talk

about it, which are cited in our reply brief in particular, have -- do present cases where, for instance, in the Golden v. Zwickler case, which was a facial challenge, the Court ultimately rejected the challenge because of, that the possibility that this -- the plaintiff there, who was Zwickler, who was a Congressman who then took a position as a Supreme Court judge wasn't in a position, that it was most unlikely that he would again be subject to the statute.

The question is what is the likelihood that this plaintiff is going to be subject to the statute again, and what we're saying is that the burden is on the plaintiff to establish that, and the only statement we have is in her affidavit saying that she fears that she won't be able to get into -- she wants an SRO, she'd like to be there, but we have no information provided of the likelihood that she will be able to get into an SRO unit.

THE COURT: All right, let me hear from your adversary. We'll come back to you. Thank you very much.

MS. SANGHVI: Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: So don't waste any time on the second argument, but the first argument seems to me to be at least one that I need to consider. If, to take the opposite of the hypo I gave to your adversary, if there was only one SRO unit in her price range in New York, which was the one that she's now agreed in her settlement with her landlord not to occupy, she

wouldn't have standing, would she?

MS. SANGHVI: I believe in that situation if there was simply one SRO in all of Manhattan, then perhaps that harm would be remote. But in our understanding, there are many SRO units that are available. We're co-counsel with the West Side SRO Law Project, they have expertise in this area.

THE COURT: I didn't see in your papers where you presented anything along those lines. Maybe I missed it.

MS. SANGHVI: We have not presented you any expert information in regards to the availability or the number of SRO units.

THE COURT: So your adversary says he doesn't know how many units it is, but it's small, the vast majority, I think is his term, of the vacant units are not SRO in her price range, so that this is just a remote contingency which would make for a fun case involving able counsel, but has little or nothing to do with actual standing.

MS. SANGHVI: Absolutely, your Honor. In the affidavit that the defendants put forward, outside of there not being much statistical reliability that they have offered us to calculate these --

THE COURT: Yes, but you didn't -- you just told me two seconds ago all the unquestioned expertise that your side has. I didn't see anything from your side on this issue.

MS. SANGHVI: Absolutely. Well, first, I believe with

some further factual development we would be able to provide your Honor and this Court with some additional expertise around the fact that there are available SRO units throughout the city; that she has not had yet the opportunity to locate one, but even if she were to locate one, the harm remains absolute today that she cannot in fact reside in one, and furthermore, as has been stated in --

because you agreed with me that if there was one and only one unit, and that was the one that she had vacated, that she wouldn't have standing. Let's say I'll double the number. Supposing there were two units; the one she vacated and one other, completely unknown to her, not actually looked at by her -- her search seems to have been very modest indeed -- and she's not under, apparently, any terrible pressure because she has an older son who's got a two-room apartment where she's at least able to abide for the moment. So if there was one other apartment out there that fits her needs, but she doesn't know about it, she hasn't looked for it and she hasn't found it, would she have standing?

MS. SANGHVI: Your Honor, first of all, even if there were one or there were two, I agree that the harm would be a bit more remote. I don't know if I would agree that there would be no standing.

THE COURT: That's what I'm asking. I'm delighted to

know that you're not sure whether you would agree or not, so which is it?

MS. SANGHVI: I believe she would continue to have standing because the harm remains imminent and actual.

THE COURT: What's the imminent harm for not being able to get into an apartment you don't even know about?

MS. SANGHVI: The fact that the law bars her from any available SRO unit, whether it's one, two or --

all of us from something we don't know about at the moment, but since we don't know about it, how can we bring an action? I mean, she has not identified any SRO fitting her needs that she would like to abide in. She has not identified, short of that, any number to suggest that there are many such units. Yes, the City's presentation is very, very weak, but at least it's something. As against that, you have given, to use a legal term of art, zilch. So how can I say that this is not a remote contingency at best under the circumstances?

MS. SANGHVI: Based even just solely on what the City has provided us and this Court in terms of what available units are there, the vast majority of these units are not rooming units -- are, sorry, regular apartments and not rooming units. That means that of the over 12,000 apartments the City claims are available for affordable housing, the vast majority of them are, yes, regular apartments, but that leaves, I don't know,

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20 percent of the 12,000 that could be rooming units, could be 30 percent, could be 10 percent. I'm not clear on what percentage of the 12,000 apparent --

THE COURT: It seems to me, and I'll put it to you this way so that your adversary can respond. We know two things. We know that there are some number of these units. We know that from the way the City has couched its own expert affidavit, and we know that a unit of that kind is something that this plaintiff would be perfectly happy to live in because not only has she so said, but more importantly, she was living in just such a unit. So the question is, is that sufficient to warrant a facial challenge? I know you're going to say the answer is yes. Let me hear from your adversary and I'll come right back.

MR. HOROWITZ: Your Honor, the housing situation the plaintiff had previously is somewhat unusual. She was living in a rooming house, she had one occupied, I believe, one entire floor of a rooming house. There aren't that many rooming houses in the City of New York. The idea of finding one, let alone two contiguous rooming units so that her entire family can live together on one floor I find -- I think Dr. Lee could testify further that those chances are very remote.

More importantly is the ability to afford two rooming units, which I think it's undisputed that the plaintiff can't afford, even assuming that it's the lower of the median rent

that the defendants have put forward. Both of those reasons; the number of available rooming units and the rent that would be charged today, as opposed to when the plaintiff was looking for a rooming unit, I think weigh in favor of that there is no standing because the possibility of this plaintiff being in a situation where she might be able to be in a rooming unit is remote.

THE COURT: All right. Here's what I think is the bottom line so far as today is concerned. I don't think I can decide this motion on the present record. In fairness to plaintiff, the affidavit from Dr. Lee came in at the end of the briefing and, therefore, there was no opportunity to respond. So I will give plaintiff's counsel an opportunity to put in one or more affidavits of a factual or expert nature. I do not want any more legal briefing. I mean that completely. If anyone cites a case, I will not read your papers. I just want facts.

I will then give defense counsel the opportunity to put in a supplemental affidavit responding to whatever the affidavits are, such as from Dr. Lee or anyone else, but again, I don't want any further legal briefing, I just want facts. So then I'll receive the motion after receiving those additional submissions.

How long does counsel want to submit those additional affidavits?

MS. SANGHVI: At a minimum, your Honor, we would appreciate two weeks.

THE COURT: Two weeks is fine. Minimum. Whenever counsel asks for a minimum, I'm always happy to give them exactly what they ask for. So, let's see, today is January 14th, so that's January 28th, and how long does the City want to respond?

MR. HOROWITZ: Your Honor, can I confer with the witness to find out his schedule?

THE COURT: Sure. Although I should tell you the choice is either two weeks or two weeks.

(Pause)

MR. HOROWITZ: Your Honor, the defense also is requesting two weeks.

THE COURT: Good idea. But I'm actually going to give you two weeks and one day, because two weeks would be

February 11, which is a holiday so you get -- I'm sorry, no, it's not. February 12 is a holiday. You may not realize

February 12 is a holiday, but this courthouse is actually closed by order of Chief Judge Kimba Wood and a good thing, I applaud her desire to honor Abraham Lincoln on his real birthday and not be merely glomming him together with President Washington. So February 11 it is. I will then, I guarantee you, I will have you at least a bottom line and hopefully a full decision, but at least a bottom line by no later than

February 22nd. This matter will in all other respects be stayed until then and then depending on what I decide either it will be dismissed or we'll pick up again with further proceedings.

Thank you so much. This matter is adjourned.

(Adjourned)